Adversarial Attacks on Gaussian Process Bandits

Eric Han,¹ Jonathan Scarlett^{1,2}

¹School of Computing, National University of Singapore (NUS) ²Department of Mathematics & Institute of Data Science, NUS eric_han@nus.edu.sg, scarlett@comp.nus.edu.sg

Highlights

We study robustness for GP optimization from an attacker's perspective, focusing on adversarial perturbations.

- 1. Study conditions under which an adversarial attack can succeed.
- 2. Present various attacks:
 - 1. Known f: Subtraction Rnd and Subtraction Sq, Clipping Attack.
 - 2. Unknown *f*: Aggressive Subtraction.

Demonstrated their effectiveness on a diverse range of functions.

Introduction

GP bandits is the problem of optimizing a black-box function *f* by using derivative-free queries guided by a GP surrogate model,

 $\max f(x).$

- Function observations can be subject to corruptions in the applications, which are not adequately captured by random noise.
- Current literature focused on proposing methods that defend against the proposed uncertainty model to improve robustness for GP opt.

Setup: With random noise $z_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$, adversarial noise c_t and attack budget C:

$$y_t = f(\mathbf{x}_t) + c_t + z_t,$$
 where $\sum_{t=1}^n |c_t| \le C$

- Two distinct attack goals:
 - 1. Targeted make the player choose actions in a particular \mathcal{R}_{target} .
 - 2. Untargeted make the player's cumulative regret high.

Theoretical Study

Theorm 1 (Rough Sketch) Adversary performs an attack shifting the original function f to \tilde{f} , with sufficient conditions, resulting in linear regret with high probability.

- Under sufficient conditions, optimizer finds peak of \tilde{f} , so we can bound the number of actions that fall outside \mathcal{R}_{target} ,
- Can then bound the budget needed for such perturbation,
- Since $\arg \max f \neq \arg \max \tilde{f}$, regret is linear.



Theory applies (even in certain cases where the attacker doesn't know f) to **any** algorithm that gets sublinear regret in non-corrupted setting.

https://github.com/eric-vader/Attack-BO

Attack Methods (Known *f*)

Subtraction Attack: 'swallow' the peaks of the function f.

$$\tilde{f}(\mathbf{x}) = f(\mathbf{x}) - h(\mathbf{x})$$

- Subtraction Rnd (Top) Let function h to be a bump fn.
- Subtraction Sq (Bottom) Let function h to be an indicator fn.



Discussion:

- 1. Strong theoretical guarantees for Rnd (depends on *h*).
- 2. Requiring knowledge of f.
- 3. Difficult to construct h in practice.

Clipping Attack: 'cut' the rest of the fn f off by Δ from the peak in \mathcal{R}_{target} .



Discussion:

- Practical, easy to implement and performs well.
- \tilde{f} not in RKHS; our theoretical analysis does not follow.

Further Information



Full paper at https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.08449.



Attack Methods (Unknown f)

Aggressive Subtraction Attack: subtract *all* points outside \mathcal{R}_{target} by roughly the same value $h_{\rm max}$.

$$\tilde{f}(\mathbf{x}) = \begin{cases} f(\mathbf{x}) & \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{target}} \\ f(\mathbf{x}) - h_{\text{max}} & \mathbf{x} \notin \mathcal{R}_{\text{target}} \end{cases}$$

- With 'transition region' (Top) So that \tilde{f} is smooth to match theory.
- Without (Bottom) Simplified version used for experiments.



Discussion:

- Strong theoretical guarantees with 'transition region'.
- 2. Just knowing that \mathcal{R}_{target} has a local maximum is sufficient.

Experiments and Results

Each point on the plots correspond a particular attack hyperparameter; averaged over several runs, where the metrics are measured:



Summary of key findings:

- Clipping works consistently.
- Aggressive Subtraction works, but with higher cost.
- Subtraction Rnd and Sq is 'in between', with Rnd narrowly beating Sq. Additional Experiments can be found in our paper; with more synthetic experiments up to 6 dimensions and robot pushing experiments.

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{R}_{ ext{target}}$$

 $\mathbf{x} \notin \mathcal{R}_{ ext{target}},$